II—Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers

The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I shall argue that the resemblance nominalist can say that those conjunctions have the same truthmakers but these truthmakers make them true in different ways. I shall also use this view to account for the truthmakers of propositions like 〈Socrates is white〉, and respond to previous objections by Cian Dorr and Jessica Wilson

The Razor and the Laser

The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the Laser should replace the Razor. In Sections 2-4 we shall discuss and argue against Schaffer’s arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. Schaffer considers several objections to his views, and in Sections 5-7 we shall argue that Schaffer does not deal successfully with two of them. In Section 8 we shall present a probabilistic argument for the Laser. However, the argument has a limitation and does not support the replacement of the Razor with the Laser. Indeed, it supports only the claim that, given certain assumptions, the multiplication of explanatorily relevant derivative entities does not matter; but, as we argue in the same section, there is an argument that multiplying explanatorily superfluous derivative entities does makes a theory less rationally acceptable. Our conclusion is that the Laser cannot replace the Razor and that derivative entities are not an ontological free lunch

Estimate of the willing to pay for ecological panela in Colombia: Approach from the Sustainable Consumption

Estimation of the environmental services values, represents a crucial element in the process of taking of decisions on environmental programs and policies to develop, as well as an orientation instrument for the implementation of production patterns and more sustainable consumption. From this perspective, the present study has as purpose to estimate the willing to pay (WTP) of the consumers from Bogota of ecological panela (product obtained from sugar canne in small rural factories). For this the method of Contingent Valuation was used. By means of selected stratified sampling a sample was determined by socioeconomic stratum for the city of Bogota the consumers were asked if they would be willing to pay for ecological panela, as well as topics related with their consumption behavior, like preferences, environmental, social commitment, and their socioeconomic characteristics. By means of the combination of this method of economic valuation and qualitative information this paper concluded that the consumers are willing to pay a bigger price for these panela types, especially for the powder ecological panela. A crucial conclusion is that, the existence of a direct relationship between the socioeconomic stratum and the WTP by conventional and ecological powder panela. Finally, it was determined that the commitment for the conservation and protection of the environment, when it is perceived by the consumer like an element that it guarantees the consumption of healthy and innocuous products, it represents a decisive factor in the willing to pay a bigger price for conventional and ecological powder panela.Ecological Panela, Contingent Valuation, Sustainable Consumption, Ecological Products.

Mixidad socioespacial y gentrificación en la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires 1991-2010: Una aproximación cuantitativa a partir de datos censales

El artículo explora la mixidad socioeconómica y la gentrificación en la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires a partir de información censal de los años 1991, 2001 y 2010, buscando cuantificar dichos fenómenos y conocer sus tendencias recientes. Entre las conclusiones se destaca que la mixidad socioeconómica es un fenómeno que tiende a decrecer en la ciudad y que, en gran medida, es de tipo transitoria, producto de su estrecho vínculo con procesos de gentrificación que la tienen como un estadio intermedio entre el comienzo de la gentrificación y la etapa en que alcanza un grado mayor de desarrollo.This paper explores socioeconomic mixture and gentrification in Buenos Aires City based on census data from 1991, 2001 and 2010 censuses, seeking to determine the magnitude and trends of these particular urban phenomena. Conclusions suggest that socioeconomic mixture is mainly transitory and related to gentrification processes as an intermediate phase.Fil: Rodriguez, Gonzalo Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales; Argentin

Postscript to Why Truthmakers

In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007)

Grounding is not a strict order

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive

Why Truthmakers?

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity

Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. The aim of this paper is to clarify Leibniz’s notion of substance in the Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between substances and accidents